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How the Tenth Circuit’s Ruling in Martinez v. Beggs 
Affects the Deliberate Indifference Standard for 
Eighth Amendment Claims 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Martinez v. Beggs,1 the Tenth Circuit held that prison officials 
were not liable under Section 19832 for a detainee’s death. Because 
the prison officials were not “deliberately indifferent to the specific 
risk” of the harm, which in this case was a heart attack that led to the 
detainee’s death,3 the court reasoned that the prison officials were 
not liable under Section 1983 for violating the detainee’s Eighth 
Amendment rights.4  
The Tenth Circuit’s holding, however, that a prison official must 
be deliberately indifferent toward the specific risk faced by detainees 
changes the deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment 
claims set by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan.5 In Farmer, 
the Court did not require knowledge of the specific risk, and instead, 
only required that the official must be “aware of facts from which the 
 
 1. 563 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 2. Section 1983 is “meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, 
privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 172 (1961). Section 1983 states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 3. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089. 
 4. The plaintiff, who was the deceased’s daughter, brought this claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1084. However, “[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, pretrial detainees are entitled to the same degree of protection against denial of 
medical care as that afforded to convicted inmates under the Eighth Amendment.” Frohmader 
v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Martin v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 
909 F.2d 401, 406 (10th Cir. 1990)). The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII. A standard for violations of a detainee’s Eighth Amendment right 
against cruel and unusual punishment is an official’s “deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see infra Part II.A.  
 5. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).  
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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
exists.”6 Additionally, the holding in Martinez disregards prior Tenth 
Circuit precedent, conflicts with other circuit court holdings, and 
unreasonably requires that all prison officials be sufficiently 
knowledgeable to understand a detainee’s specific medical risks. 
Understanding how the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Martinez 
disregards prior Tenth Circuit precedent and unreasonably changes 
the deliberate indifference standard requires reviewing the facts and 
reasoning in Martinez and the Supreme Court’s precedent 
concerning pretrial detainee’s Eighth Amendment rights. 
Specifically, Part II of this article discusses the relevant Supreme 
Court precedent, Part III provides the facts and holding in Martinez, 
and Part IV analyzes the court’s holding.  
II. THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN ESTELLE V. 
GAMBLE AND FARMER V. BRENNAN  
Two Supreme Court cases set the standard for violating a pretrial 
detainee’s Eighth Amendment rights. First, in Estelle v. Gamble, the 
Court held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical 
needs constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.7 Second, in Farmer v. 
Brennan, the Court defined deliberate indifference as disregarding a 
substantial risk by a prison official if the official was “aware of the 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 
of serious harm exists,” and if the prison official actually made this 
inference.8  
A. The Facts and Holding in Estelle v. Gamble 
J. W. Gamble, a Texas Department of Correction’s inmate, was 
significantly injured when a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on him 
 
 6. Id. at 837. 
 7. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (holding 
that unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishments). In cases dealing with pretrial detainees such as 
Martinez, the Fourteenth Amendment provides the same standard of care as the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. See supra note 4. 
 8. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
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while performing a work assignment.9 Because of the accident, 
Gamble suffered intense pain and lower back strain.10  
A doctor gave Gamble pain relievers, muscle relaxants, and a 
work pass that relieved the inmate of his work duties.11 Nearly three 
weeks later, the doctor took away Gamble’s pass and cleared Gamble 
for light work.12 However, Gamble refused to work, stating that he 
was still in too much pain.13 Because of his refusal to work, Gamble 
was moved to administrative segregation and was permitted to see 
another doctor.14 The new doctor prescribed more pain medication 
and some high blood pressure medication.15  
After a few more weeks, and after Gamble still refused to work, 
the prison disciplinary committee placed Gamble in solitary 
confinement.16 While there, Gamble asked to see a doctor for chest 
pains and “blank outs.”17 About twelve hours later, Gamble saw a 
medical assistant who ordered him hospitalized.18 At the hospital, on 
the following day, a doctor prescribed medication for irregular 
cardiac rhythm.19  
Two days later, Gamble again asked to see a doctor for chest 
pains and pain in his left arm and back;20 however, the guards 
refused. On the next day, Gamble again asked to see a doctor, but 
again, the guards denied his request.21 Finally, on the third day of 
asking to see a doctor, the guards allowed Gamble to see a doctor.22  
Gamble filed a complaint against various prison officials alleging 
that they violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and 
unusual punishment.23 The district court dismissed the case, but the 
 
 9. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 100. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 101. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. Although Gamble’s “24-page handwritten complaint” focused on the “failure to 
provide medical care needed,” Gamble v. Estelle, 516 F.2d 937, 938 (5th Cir. 1975), the 
Supreme Court stated that “[t]he gravamen of [Gamble’s] § 1983 complaint is that petitioners 
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Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.24 On certiorari, the Supreme 
Court held that a deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 
medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and 
remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit.25 
The Supreme Court reasoned that historically cruel and unusual 
punishments were limited to “physically barbarous punishments”26 
but that in today’s society, cruel and unusual punishments are 
“punishments incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of 
decency,’”27 or which “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction 
of pain.”28  
The Court reasoned that modern standards “establish the . . . 
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by 
incarceration.”29 Therefore, a deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s 
serious medical needs offends the Eighth Amendment’s evolving 
standard of decency30 and constitutes the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.31 
B. The Facts and Holding in Farmer v. Brennan 
Dee Farmer was a male-to-female transsexual serving a federal 
sentence for credit card fraud.32 Prison officials initially housed 
Farmer with the general male population, but subsequently moved 
Farmer to a higher-security prison.33 At the higher-security prison, 
 
have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” 
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101. 
 24. Gamble, 516 F.2d at 941. 
 25. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 108, remanded to 554 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1977).  
 26. Id. at 102. 
 27. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 28. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
 29. Id. The Court went on to say that “[t]he infliction of such unnecessary suffering is 
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation 
codifying the common law view that . . . ‘the public be required to care for the prisoner, who 
cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.’” Id. at 103–04 (citations 
omitted). 
 30. Id. at 106. 
 31. Id. at 105. 
 32. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). Farmer wore women’s clothing and 
had previously undergone estrogen therapy, breast-implant surgery, and testicle-removal 
surgery. Id. 
 33. Id. at 830. 
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another inmate, who was HIV positive and who shared Farmer’s cell, 
beat and raped Farmer.34  
Farmer, acting pro se, filed a Bivens complaint35 alleging that 
federal officials acted deliberately indifferent to Farmer’s safety by 
housing him with historically violent inmates where he would be 
vulnerable to sexual attack.36 Farmer alleged that this violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights.37 
The district court ruled against Farmer, reasoning that the 
defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Farmer’s safety 
because, in part, Farmer never outwardly expressed any safety 
concerns.38 Thus, the defendants could not be deliberately 
indifferent to Farmer’s safety since they were not aware of the risk.39 
Farmer appealed, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling without opinion.40  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the deliberate 
indifference standard laid out in Estelle.41 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that Eighth Amendment liability requires more than 
ordinary negligence for the prisoner’s safety and that Eighth 
Amendment liability lays “somewhere between the poles of 
negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other.”42  
Therefore, the Court held that a prison official cannot be liable 
under the deliberate indifference standard unless the “official knows 
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”43 
Further, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
 
 34. Id. at 830, 851. 
 35. A Bivens complaint is an action against federal agents for constitutional violations. 
See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  
 36. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830–31. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 831–32. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 832. 
 41. Id. at 828–29, 832. 
 42. Id. at 836. See generally Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (illustrating the concern that § 1983 litigation too closely parallels general tort 
law: Modern § 1983 precedent has changed § 1983 from a “statute that had generated only 
21 cases in the first 50 years of its existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens of 
thousands of suits each year, and engages this Court in a losing struggle to prevent the 
Constitution from degenerating into a general tort law”).  
 43. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
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exists, and he must also draw the inference.”44 This standard, the 
Court reasoned, is subjective and similar to the criminal law 
recklessness standard, which is a “familiar and workable standard that 
is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause . . . 
under the Eighth Amendment.”45 
The Court reasoned, however, that “[w]hether a prison official 
had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact 
subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from 
circumstantial evidence,” and that “a factfinder may conclude that a 
prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the 
risk was obvious.”46 The Court reached this conclusion by reasoning 
that the Eighth Amendment is about protecting prisoners from 
substantial risks and that “it would obviously be irrelevant to liability 
that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely who would 
attack whom.”47  
III. THE FACTS AND HOLDING IN MARTINEZ V. BEGGS 
On May 2, 2006, three Oklahoma police officers, responding to 
a “fight in progress” call,48 observed Kenneth Ginn sitting on a 
porch.49 An officer approached Ginn and asked if he needed medical 
attention. Ginn responded by saying he was “alright.”50 However, 
the officer noticed that Ginn’s “speech was slurred, his eyes were 
bloodshot, and he smelled of alcohol.”51 Ginn admitted he had been 
drinking, and a by-stander told the officers that Ginn “had drunk an 
entire bottle of whiskey,” “seemed to be hallucinating,” and was 
looking for a fight.52 One of the officers offered to take Ginn home, 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 839–40. 
 46. Id. at 842. The Court also stated that if the “defendant-official being sued had been 
exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it, then such 
evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had 
actual knowledge of the risk.” Id. at 842–43. 
 47. Id. at 843–44. The Court also reasoned that a “prison official [may not] escape 
liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, 
substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was especially likely to 
be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” Id. at 843 
(emphasis added). 
 48. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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but “Ginn replied that he did not want to go home and . . . 
threatened to fight the officers.”53 
The officers arrested Ginn for public intoxication and took him 
to the detention center.54 “Video surveillance from the detention 
center shows [the officers] escorting Ginn down the hallway toward 
the receiving cell,” because he “could not walk in a straight line.”55  
That evening, the officers at the detention center “were 
responsible for conducting sight checks” on Ginn at least every thirty 
minutes;56 however, “no one logged in a sight check of Ginn” until 
about three hours after he arrived at the detention center.57 When an 
officer finally checked on him, he found “Ginn dead, with his body 
in a kneeling position.”58 A medical examiner stated that Ginn died 
of a heart attack, and a medical expert declared that he died because 
of heart disease compounded by his toxic blood-alcohol level.59 
A. Procedural History 
Following his death, Ginn’s daughter, Ginger Martinez, 
individually and on behalf of Ginn’s estate, filed a § 1983 action 
against the county board of commissioners, the local sheriff, and the 
officers at the detention center.60 Martinez’s action alleged 
Fourteenth Amendment violations61 for deliberate indifference to 
Ginn’s medical needs.62 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants based on qualified immunity.63 The court reasoned, in 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1085–86. 
 55. Id. at 1086. 
 56. Id. The detention center manual states:  
Any inmate who is charged with being under the influence of alcohol or drugs or 
who has alcohol on his breath at the time of booking should be considered as a 
possible alcoholic. Inmates requiring detoxification or booked on drug charges will 
be placed in a holding cell for 4 to 6 hours or until sober and observed a minimum 
of every 30 minutes . . . . 
Id. 
 57. Id. at 1087. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 1084. 
 61. See supra note 4.  
 62. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1084. 
 63. Martinez v. Beggs, No. CIV-07-132-F, 2008 WL 200261, at *12 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 
24, 2008). 
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part, that Martinez failed to show that the defendants violated the 
deliberate indifference standard and that the government officials 
performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity 
as long as their conduct does not “violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”64  
Martinez appealed the district court’s ruling that summary 
judgment was appropriate in this case. On appeal, Martinez argued 
that “[t]here are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the 
Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and whether they 
were deliberately indifferent” to Ginn’s serious medical needs.65  
B. The Court’s Holding 
The Tenth Circuit rejected Martinez’s arguments and affirmed 
the district court’s ruling that the defendants were entitled to 
qualified immunity.66 The court held that the defendants did not 
violate Ginn’s constitutional rights, and therefore, the defendants 
could not be liable as a matter of law.67 To reach this holding, the 
Tenth Circuit reasoned that the test for the Eighth Amendment’s 
deliberate indifference standard is both objective and subjective and 
that Martinez failed to prove the subjective part of the test.68 
The court held that the ultimate harm to Ginn—his heart attack 
and his death—met the objective component, which is satisfied if the 
“‘harm suffered rises to a level “sufficiently serious” to be cognizable 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’ of the Eighth 
Amendment.”69 The court, however, held that Martinez failed to 
meet the subjective part of the test because Martinez did not show 
that the defendants knew Ginn faced the substantial risk of heart 
attack and death and they disregarded that risk.70 The Tenth Circuit 
stated that Martinez was required to show that “defendants were 
 
 64. Id. at *6 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 65. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, Martinez v. Beggs, No. 08-6042 (10th Cir. June 9, 
2008), 2008 WL 2513979, at *1. 
 66. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1084. 
 67. Id. at 1092. 
 68. Id. at 1088–90. 
 69. Id. at 1088 (quoting Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752–53 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
 70. Id. at 1090. 
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deliberately indifferent to the specific risk” of heart attack and death, 
and “not merely to the risk of intoxication.”71  
In holding that defendants must be subjectively aware of a 
specific risk, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the Farmer rule that a 
“factfinder may conclude that a prison official subjectively knew of 
the substantial risk of harm by circumstantial evidence” by “the very 
fact that the risk was obvious.”72 However, the court reasoned that 
“an obvious risk cannot conclusively establish an inference that the 
official subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm because ‘a 
prison official may show that the obvious escaped him.’”73 
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN MARTINEZ V. BEGGS 
DISREGARDS PRECEDENT, CHANGES THE DELIBERATE 
INDIFFERENCE STANDARD, AND UNREASONABLY REQUIRES 
KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFIC RISKS  
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Martinez improperly disregards 
prior Tenth Circuit precedent, namely Estate of Hocker v. Walsh74 
and Garcia v. Salt Lake County,75 and conflicts with other circuit 
court holdings, which simply require that the official be “aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 
of serious harm exists.”76 In addition, the holding changes the 
deliberate indifference standard set forth in Farmer by unreasonably 
requiring that prison officials be sufficiently knowledgeable to 
understand a detainee’s specific medical situation.  
A. The Tenth Circuit in Martinez v. Beggs Disregards Its Own 
Holdings in Estate of Hocker v. Walsh and Garcia v. Salt Lake 
County 
In Martinez, the Tenth Circuit, by quoting Estate of Hocker, 
held that the defendants must be deliberately indifferent to specific 
risks.77 In Estate of Hocker, an intoxicated inmate hung herself after 
 
 71. Id. at 1089–90 (citing Estate of Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 
1994)). 
 72. Id. at 1089 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). 
 73. Id.  
 74. 22 F.3d at 1000. 
 75. 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985).  
 76. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  
 77. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089; see supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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spending two days in a detention center. The deceased-inmate’s 
estate sued the county and the sheriff, alleging that the “detention 
center’s policy of admitting intoxicated and unconscious individuals 
showed deliberate indifference.”78  
The Tenth Circuit held that “to establish deliberate indifference 
to an inmate’s safety the plaintiff must show . . . ‘actual knowledge 
of the specific risk of harm [to the detainee] . . . or that the risk was 
so substantial or pervasive that knowledge can be inferred.’”79 The 
court reasoned that “no facts suggest that the Detention Center staff 
had knowledge of the specific risk that [the inmate] would commit 
suicide. Nor do the facts suggest that [the inmate’s] risk of suicide 
was so substantial or pervasive that knowledge can be inferred.”80  
However, the court in Martinez disregarded the “or” in Estate of 
Hocker’s holding, which establishes deliberate indifference if, in part, 
an official has knowledge of a specific risk or if the risk was so 
substantial or pervasive that the official has inferred knowledge.81 
Instead, the court in Martinez simply held that the “defendants 
must . . . disregard”82 the specific risks and that inferring knowledge 
of a risk, because the risk is obvious, cannot conclusively prove 
subjective knowledge.83 By disregarding the “or,” and thereby 
effectively disregarding the possibility of inferring knowledge of 
obvious risks, the Tenth Circuit in Martinez changed the deliberate 
indifference standard set forth in Farmer and disregarded the 
holding in Estate of Hocker. 
In addition to disregarding the holding in Estate of Hocker, the 
Tenth Circuit also improperly disregarded the holding in Garcia v. 
Salt Lake County.84 In Garcia, officers arrested Garcia for drunk 
driving.85 However, because Garcia complained of severe pain, an 
ambulance took him to the hospital.86 At the hospital, Garcia secretly 
 
 78. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089; Estate of Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 997 (10th 
Cir. 1994).  
 79. Estate of Hocker, 22 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 
1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 80. Id.  
 81. See Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089. 
 82. Id. at 1089–90 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 1089; see supra text accompanying notes 71–73. 
 84. 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 85. Id. at 305. 
 86. Id.  
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ingested barbiturates87 and escaped.88 Police officers found Garcia 
passed out near a hospital entrance and, after a doctor determined 
that he was semi-conscious, took him to jail.89 
At 3:43 p.m., Garcia arrived at jail, where the jail medic 
instructed officers to check on Garcia every fifteen to twenty 
minutes.90 The jail officers checked on Garcia every thirty minutes, 
and at about 8:30 p.m., the medic found Garcia unconscious but left 
him in his cell.91 At about 10:15 p.m. Garcia appeared to be dead 
and was transported to the hospital where he eventually died.92 A 
medical expert stated, “Garcia would have survived the alcohol and 
barbiturate overdose . . . if he had been transported to the hospital 
when observed at 8:30 p.m. . . . and found to be unconscious.”93 
The Tenth Circuit in Garcia found for the plaintiffs, holding 
that “the county policy of admitting unconscious persons into the 
jail and the jail’s medical staffing deficiencies” constituted deliberate 
indifference, which violated Garcia’s constitutional rights.94 The 
Tenth Circuit reached this holding even though the jail officers and 
jail medic did not specifically know that Garcia ingested barbiturates.  
The court in Martinez refused to follow Garcia’s holding and 
distinguished Garcia on the facts. The court stated, “Although 
defendants in Garcia were aware that Garcia was unconscious for 
many hours, they took no action to attend to his obvious medical 
needs. By comparison, [in Martinez,] Ginn was conscious, on his 
feet, argumentative, and cognizant that he was being arrested.”95 
Further, the court noted that in Martinez, Ginn “showed no obvious 
symptoms indicating a risk of serious harm” and exhibited no 
“symptoms that would predict his imminent heart attack or death.”96 
 
 87. Id. Two days before Garcia’s arrest, Garcia had urinary-tract surgery. Id. After this 
surgery, doctors prescribed these barbiturates to Garcia. Id. The medical staff involved with 
Garcia after his arrest did not know Garcia had these barbiturates in his possession. Id.   
 88. Id. at 305. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 305–06. 
 92. Id. at 306. Garcia was taken to the hospital on December 29, 1977. Id. At the 
hospital, doctors placed Garcia on life support but discontinued the life support on January 12, 
1978. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009); Garcia, 768 F.2d at 
308.  
 95. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1091. 
 96. Id. 
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This factual distinction, however, was flawed: the court 
compared Garcia’s time in jail, while Garcia was unconscious and 
checked on every thirty minutes by officers, to Ginn’s conscious state 
before Ginn was arrested. Because the officers did not check on Ginn 
during the three hours he was in his cell,97 it is possible that he was 
unconscious, as was Garcia. Thus, the officers simply shielded 
themselves from knowing Ginn’s specific risks by not checking on 
him. The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Martinez, therefore, not only 
disregards the court’s holding in Garcia by wrongly distinguishing 
Garcia on the facts, but also subsequently encourages ignorance by 
prison officials. 
B. Requiring Knowledge of Specific Risk Conflicts with the            
Holdings of Other Circuit Courts 
By requiring prison officials to know of the specific risk faced by 
a particular inmate, the Tenth Circuit’s holding conflicts with every 
other circuit court except for the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Johnson 
v. Quinones. In Johnson v. Quinones, an inmate alleged that prison 
doctors were deliberately indifferent because the doctors failed to 
diagnose a pituitary tumor that eventually caused the inmate to lose 
his sight.98 The Fourth Circuit held that the prison doctors must 
understand the specific risk of harm facing an inmate by actually 
connecting the inmate’s symptoms to a specific medical condition, 
which in this case was a pituitary tumor.99 The court reasoned that a 
“general knowledge of facts creating a substantial risk of harm is not 
enough.”100  
The Fourth Circuit’s standard, and the Tenth Circuit’s holding 
in Martinez, however, conflict with every other circuit court, which 
only require that an official know of and disregard an excessive risk 
to inmate health or safety.101 In addition, the Third, Fifth, Seventh, 
 
 97. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 98. 145 F.3d 164, 165–66 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 99. Id. at 168.  
 100. Id. By holding this way, the Fourth Circuit did not clarify whether this standard 
applies only to doctors and other medical personnel. It is highly problematic and unreasonable 
to require that non-medical personnel, such as the prison guards in Martinez, have sufficient 
medical knowledge to understand the specific medical risks faced by inmates. See infra Part 
IV.D.  
 101. See Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008); Phillips v. Roane County, 
Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2008); Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 
(8th Cir. 2007); Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2006); Bozeman v. 
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and Ninth Circuits have specifically denounced the approach 
requiring knowledge of a specific risk.102 For example, in Gibson v. 
County of Washoe, Nevada, a manic-depressive detainee suffered a 
heart attack and died while in custody of the county sheriff’s 
department.103 The detainee’s widow sued the county, the sheriff, 
and various other officials.104 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
defendants may be liable for the harm to a detainee even though the 
defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s mental 
health and not to the specific harm suffered by the detainee—a heart 
attack and death.105 
Further, in Gobert v. Caldwell, after an inmate injured his leg and 
had surgery, the prison doctor failed to diagnose an infection in the 
inmate’s leg.106 The Fifth Circuit held that specific knowledge of an 
inmate’s infection was not required; instead, all that was required 
was an “aware[ness] of a substantial risk of serious harm to [the 
inmate] from the nature of the wound itself.”107 
C. Martinez v. Beggs Changes the Deliberate Indifference Standard 
By requiring that prison officials understand the specific risks 
faced by inmates, the Tenth Circuit changed the deliberate 
indifference standard established by the Supreme Court in Farmer.108 
In Farmer, the Court held that an “official must both be aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”109 The 
 
Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403–04 
(2d Cir. 2005); Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2002); Gibson v. 
County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1191–93 (9th Cir. 2002); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 
256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 102. See Dale, 548 F.3d at 569 (holding that “[t]he precise identity of the threat . . . is 
irrelevant” and that “[a] prison official cannot escape liability by showing that he did not know 
that a plaintiff was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner”) (citation omitted); 
Gobert, 463 F.3d at 348–49; Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1191–93; Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 131 
(“In fact, Farmer anticipated that a plaintiff could make out a deliberate indifference case by 
showing that prison officials simply were aware of a general risk to inmates in the plaintiff's 
situation . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 103. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1180. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1191–93. 
 106. Gobert, 463 F.3d at 343–44. 
 107. Id. at 348–49. 
 108. See supra Part II.B. 
 109. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
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Tenth Circuit changed the holding in Farmer by disregarding the 
requirement that officials be aware of facts from which an “inference 
could be drawn” about a substantial risk and replaced it with the 
requirement that officials must know the specific risk.  
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit in Martinez ignored clarifying 
dictum in Farmer. The Court in Farmer stated that “[i]n prison-
conditions cases [the] state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ 
to inmate health or safety.”110 The Court did not state that the state 
of mind is deliberate indifference to specific health or safety risks. 
Therefore, to be deliberately indifferent, an official does not need to 
know the specific risk; deliberate indifference only requires an official 
to know facts from which an inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate’s health or safety 
exists.111  
The court also ignored the dictum in Farmer that clarified that a 
prison official may not “escape liability for deliberate indifference by 
showing that . . . he did not know the complainant was especially 
likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner.”112 The court in 
Martinez acknowledged, but it ultimately distinguished this dictum 
on the facts. The court reasoned that Farmer was a prisoner assault 
case, and in prisoner assault cases, the officer does not need to know 
the specific assailant and only needs to know about the substantial 
risk of assault.113 However, the Martinez court erred in making this 
distinction because factually distinguishing prisoner-assault cases 
from other prisoner Eighth Amendment cases is not necessary, 
especially since the Supreme Court did not make this distinction 
when it applied the holding in Estelle, a prisoner’s medical needs 
case, to Farmer, a prisoner-assault case.114  
Additionally, the Martinez court did not justify why it could 
require knowledge of the specific harm faced by Ginn—the heart 
 
 110. Id. at 834. 
 111. The Martinez court rightly reasoned that there should be some connection between 
the eventual harm and the official’s knowledge, Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 n.8 
(10th Cir. 2009), but it would be erroneous to conclude that this connection requires actual 
knowledge of the specific risk. Instead, this connection will always be incidentally satisfied by 
the Farmer Court’s requirement that an “official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
834 (emphasis added).  
 112. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (emphasis added).  
 113. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089 n.8. 
 114. See supra Part II. 
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attack—instead of simply requiring general knowledge of an 
“excessive risk to inmate health or safety” as required in Farmer.115 
Applying the Farmer Court’s rationale that it is obviously “irrelevant 
to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely who 
would attack whom”116 to Martinez means that Ginn faced possible 
death, yet it is obviously irrelevant to liability to require that the 
officials know beforehand what specific risk would cause his death.  
 
D. Martinez v. Beggs Unreasonably Requires that Prison Officials 
Understand Specific Risks 
 
Finally, the requirement that prison officials know the specific 
risk facing an inmate unreasonably requires prison officials to be 
sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the specific risk. To 
illustrate, in another Tenth Circuit case, Farhat v. Young, an inmate 
asserted that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his 
medical needs after the inmate suffered, in part, “pneumothoraces 
with subcutaneous emphysema, suspected esophageal perforation, 
disorientation, sepsis cultured as Streptococcus . . . , severe 
dehydration, rhabdomyolysis, renal failure, cognitive deficit . . . , and 
multiple organ failure syndrome.”117 Though the Tenth Circuit in 
Farhat did not discuss the holding in Martinez that prison officials 
must know these specific risks,118 if the court in Farhat were to apply 
the Martinez deliberate indifference standard, the prison officials in 
Farhat would have to be sufficiently knowledgeable to understand 
each of the above-mentioned specific medical risks. Requiring that 
prison officials understand specific risks is unreasonable and would 
place an unreasonable burden of proof on plaintiffs.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note does not argue that the outcome in Martinez was 
wrong; in fact, the outcome of the case may be correct under the 
deliberate indifference standard set forth in Farmer. However, the 
Tenth Circuit in Martinez wrongly changed the Supreme Court’s 
 
 115. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 
 116. Id. at 843–44; see supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 117. No. 08-6159, 2009 WL 2733228, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 118. The court in Farhat discussed only qualified immunity and dismissed the case for 
lack of jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at *1. 
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deliberate indifference standard set forth in Farmer by requiring 
knowledge of specific risks. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit’s holding 
in Martinez disregards prior Tenth Circuit precedent, conflicts with 
other circuit courts, and unreasonably requires that all prison officials 
be sufficiently knowledgeable to understand a detainee’s specific 
medical risks. 
The correct standard for determining Eighth Amendment 
violations to a pretrial detainee’s rights is that “a prison official 
cannot be found liable . . . for denying an inmate humane conditions 
of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an 
excessive risk to inmate health or safety. . . . [And that] the official 
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 
draw the inference.”119 To require anything more than knowing 
enough to draw an inference of a substantial risk, i.e., requiring that 
a prison official must know the specific risks, changes the deliberate 
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